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Abstract
Robustness of Deep Reinforcement Learning (DRL) algo-
rithms towards adversarial attacks in real world applications
such as those deployed in cyber-physical systems (CPS) are
of increasing concern. Numerous studies have investigated
the mechanisms of attacks on the RL agent’s state space.
Nonetheless, attacks on the RL agent’s action space (cor-
responding to actuators in engineering systems) are equally
perverse, but such attacks are relatively less studied in the
ML literature. In this work, we first frame the problem as
an optimization problem of minimizing the cumulative re-
ward of an RL agent with decoupled constraints as the budget
of attack. We propose the white-box Myopic Action Space
(MAS) attack algorithm that distributes the attacks across the
action space dimensions. Next, we reformulate the optimiza-
tion problem above with the same objective function, but with
a temporally coupled constraint on the attack budget to take
into account the approximated dynamics of the agent. This
leads to the white-box Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) at-
tack algorithm that distributes the attacks across the action
and temporal dimensions. Our results showed that using the
same amount of resources, the LAS attack deteriorates the
agent’s performance significantly more than the MAS attack.
This reveals the possibility that with limited resource, an ad-
versary can utilize the agent’s dynamics to malevolently craft
attacks that causes the agent to fail. Additionally, we leverage
these attack strategies as a possible tool to gain insights on
the potential vulnerabilities of DRL agents.
Introduction
The spectrum of Reinforcement Learning (RL) applications
ranges from engineering design and control (Lee et al. 2019;
Tan et al. 2019) to business (Hu et al. 2018) and creative
design (Peng et al. 2018). As RL-based frameworks are in-
creasingly deployed in real-world, it is imperative that the
safety and reliability of these frameworks are well under-
stood. While any adversarial infiltration of these systems
can be costly, the safety of DRL systems deployed in cyber-
physical systems (CPS) such as industrial robotic applica-
tions and self-driving vehicles are especially safety and life-
critical.
∗Corresponding Author
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A root cause of these safety concerns is that in certain ap-
plications, the inputs to an RL system can be accessed and
modified adversarially to cause the RL agent to take sub-
optimal (or even harmful) actions. This is especially true
when deep neural networks (DNNs) are used as key com-
ponents (e.g., to represent policies) of RL agents. Recently,
a wealth of results in the ML literature demonstrated that
DNNs can be fooled to misclassify images by perturbing
the input by an imperceptible amount (Goodfellow, Shlens,
and Szegedy 2015) or by introducing specific natural look-
ing attributes (Joshi et al. 2019). Such adversarial perturba-
tions have also demonstrated the impacts of attacks on an
RL agent’s state space as shown by (Huang et al. 2017).
Besides perturbing the RL agent’s state space, it is also
important to consider adversarial attacks on the agent’s ac-
tion space, which in engineering systems, represents physi-
cally manipulable actuators. We note that (model-based) ac-
tuator attacks have been studied in the cyber-physical secu-
rity community, including vulnerability of continuous sys-
tems to discrete time attacks (Kim et al. 2016); theoret-
ical characteristics of undetectable actuator attacks (Ayas
and Djouadi 2016); and “defense” schemes that re-stabilizes
a system when under actuation attacks (Huang and Dong
2018). However, the issue of adversarial attacks on a RL
agent’s action space has relatively been ignored in the DRL
literature. In this work, we present a suite of novel attack
strategies on a RL agent’s action space.
Our contributions:
1. We formulate a white-box Myopic Action Space (MAS)
attack strategy as an optimization problem with decoupled
constraints.
2. We extend the formulation above by coupling constraints
to compute a non-myopic attack that is derived from the
agent’s state-action dynamics and develop a white-box
Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) attack strategy. Empiri-
cally, we show that LAS crafts a stronger attack than MAS
using the same budget.
3. We illustrate how these attack strategies can be used to
understand a RL agent’s vulnerabilities.
4. We present analysis to show that our proposed attack algo-
rithms leveraging projected gradient descent on the surro-
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gate reward function (represented by the trained RL agent
model) converges to the same effect of applying projected
gradient descent on the true reward function.
Related Works
Due to the large amount of recent progress in the area of
adversarial machine learning, we only focus on reviewing
the most recent attack and defense mechanisms proposed for
DRL models. Table 1 presents the primary landscape of this
area of research to contextualize our work.
Adversarial Attacks on RL Agent
Several studies of adversarial attacks on DRL systems have
been conducted recently. (Huang et al. 2017) extended the
idea of FGSM attacks in deep learning to RL agent’s poli-
cies to degrade the performance of a trained RL agent. Fur-
thermore, (Behzadan and Munir 2017) showed that these
attacks on the agent’s state space are transferable to other
agents. Additionally, (Tretschk, Oh, and Fritz 2018) pro-
posed attaching an Adversarial Transformer Network (ATN)
to the RL agent to learn perturbations that will deceive the
RL agent to pursue an adversarial reward. While the attack
strategies mentioned above are effective, they do not con-
sider the dynamics of the agent. One exception is the work
by (Lin et al. 2017) that proposed two attack strategies. One
strategy was to attack the agent when the difference in prob-
ability/value of the best and worst action crosses a certain
threshold. The other strategy was to combine a video predic-
tion model that predicts future states and a sampling-based
action planning scheme to craft adversarial inputs to lead the
agent to an adversarial goal, which might not be scalable.
Other studies of adversarial attacks on the specific appli-
cation of DRL for path-finding have also been conducted by
(Xiang et al. 2018) and (Bai et al. 2018), which results in the
RL agent failing to find a path to the goal or planning a path
that is more costly.
Robustification of RL Agents
As successful attack strategies are being developed for RL
models, various works on training RL agents to be ro-
bust against attacks have also been conducted. (Pattanaik
et al. 2018) proposed that a more severe attack can be en-
gineered by increasing the probability of the worst action
rather than decreasing the probability of the best action.
They showed that the robustness of an RL agent can be
improved by training the agent using these adversarial ex-
amples. More recently, (Tessler, Efroni, and Mannor 2019)
presented a method to robustify RL agent’s policy towards
action space perturbations by formulating the problem as
a zero-sum Markov game. In their formulation, a separate
nominal and adversary policy are trained simultaneously
with a critic network being updated over the mixture of both
policies to improve both adversarial and nominal policies.
Meanwhile, (Havens, Jiang, and Sarkar 2018) proposed a
method to detect and mitigate attacks by employing a hierar-
chical learning framework with multiple sub-policies. They
showed that the framework reduces agent’s bias to maintain
high nominal rewards in the absence of adversaries. We note
that other methods to defend against adversarial attacks ex-
ist, such as studies done by (Trame`r et al. 2017) and (Sinha,
Namkoong, and Duchi 2018). These works are done mainly
in the context of a DNN but may be extendable to DRL
agents that employs DNN as policies, however discussing
these works in detail goes beyond the scope of this work.
Mathematical Formulation
Preliminaries
We focus exclusively on model-free RL approaches. Be-
low, let st and at denote the (continuous, possibly high-
dimensional) vector variables denoting state and action, re-
spectively, at time t. We assume a state evolution function,
st+1 = E(st, at) and let R(st, at) denote the reward sig-
nal the agent receives for taking the action at, given st. The
goal of the RL agent is to choose actions that maximizes the
cumulative reward,
∑
tR(st, at), given access to the trajec-
tory, τ , comprising all past states and actions. In value-based
methods, the RL agent determines action at each time step
by finding an intermediate quantity called the value func-
tion that satisfies the recursive Bellman Equations. One ex-
ample of such method is Q-learning (Watkins and Dayan
1992) where the agent discovers the Q-function, defined re-
cursively as:
Qt(st, at) = R(st, at) + max
a′
Qt+1(E(st, at), a
′).
The optimal action (or “policy”) at each time step is to deter-
ministically select the action that maximizes this Q-function
conditioned on the observed state, i.e.,
a∗t = arg max
a
Q(st, a).
In DRL, the Q-function in the above formulation is approx-
imated via a parametric neural network Θ; methods to train
these networks include Deep Q-networks (Mnih et al. 2015).
In policy-based methods such as policy gradients (Sutton
et al. 2000), the RL agent directly maps trajectories to poli-
cies. In contrast with Q-learning, the selected action is sam-
pled from the policy parameterized by a probability distri-
bution, pi = P(a|s,Θ), such that the expected rewards (with
expectations taken over pi) are maximized:
pi∗ = arg max
pi
E[R(τ)], a∗t ∼ pi∗.
In DRL, the optimal policy pi is the output of a parametric
neural network Θ, and actions at each time step are sampled;
methods to train this neural network include proximal policy
optimization (PPO) (Schulman et al. 2017).
Threat Model
Our goal is to identify adversarial vulnerabilities in RL
agents in a principled manner. To this end, We define a for-
mal threat model, where we assume the adversary possesses
the following capabilities:
1. Access to RL agent’s action stream. The attacker can
directly perturb the agent’s nominal action adversarially
(under reasonable bounds, elaborated below). The nomi-
nal agent is also assumed to be a closed-loop system and
have no active defense mechanisms.
Table 1: Landscape of adversarial attack strategies on RL agents. First column denotes if the attack takes into account the
dynamics of the agent. Second column shows the method of computing the attacks; O denotes an optimization-based method
and M denotes a model-based method where the parameters of a model needs to be learned. Last column represents if the
attacks are mounted on agent’s state space (S) or action space (A).
Method Includes Dynamics Method Space of Attack
FGSM on Policies (Huang et al. 2017) X O S
ATN (Tretschk, Oh, and Fritz 2018) X M S
Gradient based Adversarial Attack (Pattanaik et al. 2018) X O S
Policy Induction Attacks (Behzadan and Munir 2017) X O S
Strategically-Timed and Enchanting Attack (Lin et al. 2017) X O, M S
NR-MDP (Tessler, Efroni, and Mannor 2019) X M A
Myopic Action Space (MAS) X O A
Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) X O A
2. Access to RL agent’s training environment. This is re-
quired to perform forward simulations to design an opti-
mal sequence of perturbations (elaborated below).
3. Knowledge of trained RL agent’s DNN. This is needed
to understand how the RL agent acts under nominal con-
ditions, and to compute gradients. In the adversarial ML
literature, this assumption is commonly made under the
umbrella of white-box attacks.
In the context of the above assumptions, the goal of the
attacker is to choose a (bounded) action space perturba-
tion that minimizes long-term discounted rewards. Based
on how the attacker chooses to perturb actions, we define
and construct two types of optimization-based attacks. We
note that alternative approaches, such as training another
RL agent to learn a sequence of attacks, is also plausible.
However, an optimization-based approach is computation-
ally more tractable to generate on-the-fly attacks for a tar-
get agent compared to training another RL agent (especially
for high-dimensional continuous action spaces considered
here) to generate attacks. Therefore, we restrict our focus on
optimization-based approaches in this paper.
Myopic Action-Space (MAS) Attack Model
We first consider the case where the attacker is myopic, i.e.,
at each time step, they design perturbations in a greedy man-
ner without regards to future considerations. Formally, let δt
be the action space perturbation (to be determined) and b be
a budget constraint on the magnitude of each δt 1. At each
time step t, the attacker designs δt such that the anticipated
future reward is minimized
min
δt
Radv(δt) = R(st, at + δt) +
T∑
j=t+1
R(sj , aj)
subject to : ‖δt‖p ≤ b,
sj+1 = E(sj , aj),
aj = Θ(sj) (for j = t, . . . , T ),
(1)
where ‖ · ‖p denotes the `p-norm for some p ≥ 1. Observe
that while the attacker ostensibly solves separate (decou-
pled) problems at each time, the states themselves are not
1Physically, the budget may reflect a real physical constraint,
such as the energy requirements to influence an actuation, or it may
be a reflection on the degree of imperceptibility of the attack.
independent since given any trajectory, sj+1 = E(sj , aj),
where E(sj , aj) is the transition of the environment based
on sj and aj . Therefore, R is implicitly coupled through
time since it depends heavily on the evolution of state tra-
jectories rather than individual state visitations. Hence, the
adversary perturbations solved above are strictly myopic and
we consider this a static attack on the agent’s action space.
Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) Attack Model
Next, we consider the case where the attacker is able
to look ahead and chooses a designed sequence of fu-
ture perturbations. Using the same notation as above, let∑t+H
j=t R(sj , aj+δj) denote the sum of rewards until a hori-
zon parameterH , and let
∑T
j=t+H+1R(sj , aj) be the future
sum of rewards from time j = t+H + 1. Additionally, we
consider the (concatenated) matrix ∆ = [δt, δt+1 . . . δt+H ]
and B denote a budget parameter. The attacker solves the
optimization problem:
min
∆
Radv(∆) =
t+H∑
j=t
R(sj , aj + δj) +
T∑
j=t+H+1
R(sj , aj)
subject to : ‖∆‖p,q ≤ B,∆ = [δt, δt+1, . . . , δH ],
sj+1 = E(sj , aj),
aj = Θ(sj)
(2)
where ‖ · ‖p,q denotes the `p,q-norm (Boyd and Vanden-
berghe 2004). By coupling the objective function and con-
straints through the temporal dimension, the solution to the
optimization problem above is then forced to take the dy-
namics of the agent into account in an explicit manner.
Proposed Algorithms
In this section, we present two attack algorithms based on
the optimization formulations presented in previous section.
Algorithm for Mounting MAS Attacks
We observe that (1) is a nonlinear constrained optimization
problem; therefore, an immediate approach to solve it is via
projected gradient descent (PGD). Specifically, let S denote
the `p ball of radius b in the action space. We compute the
gradient of the adversarial reward, ∇Radv w.r.t. the action
space variables and obtain the unconstrained adversarial ac-
tion aˆt+ 12 using gradient descent with step size η. Next, we
calculate the unconstrained perturbation δt and project in
onto S to get δ′t :
aˆt+ 12 = at − η∇Radv(st, aˆt),
δt = aˆt+ 12 − at,
δ′t = PS(δt).
(3)
Here, at represents the nominal action. We note that
this approach resembles the fast gradient-sign method
(FGSM) (Goodfellow, Shlens, and Szegedy 2015), although
we compute standard gradients here. As a variation, we can
compute multiple steps of gradient descent w.r.t the action
variable prior to projection; this is analogous to the basic it-
erative method (or iterative FGSM) (Kurakin, Goodfellow,
and Bengio 2016). The MAS attack algorithm is shown in
the supplementary material.
We note that in DRL approaches, only a noisy proxy of the
true reward function is available: In value-based methods,
we utilize the learned Q-function (for example, a DQN) as
an approximate of the true reward function, while in policy-
iteration methods, we use the probability density function
returned by the optimal policy as a proxy of the reward,
under the assumption that actions with high probability in-
duces a high expected reward. Since DQN selects the action
based on the argmax of Q-values and policy iteration sam-
ples the action with highest probability, the Q-values/action-
probability remains a useful proxy for the reward in our at-
tack formulation. Therefore, our proposed MAS attack is
technically a version of noisy projected gradient descent on
the policy evaluation of the nominal agent. We elaborate on
this further in the theoretical analysis section.
Algorithm for Mounting LAS Attacks
The previous algorithm is myopic and can be interpreted as
a purely spatial attack. In this section, we propose a spa-
tiotemporal attack algorithm by solving Eq. (2) over a given
time window H . Due to the coupling of constraints in time,
this approach is more involved. We initialize a copy of both
the nominal agent and environment, called the adversary and
adversarial environment respectively. At time t, we sample
a virtual roll-out trajectory up until a certain horizon t + H
using the pair of adversarial agent and environment. At each
time step k of the virtual roll-out, we compute action space
perturbations δt,k by taking (possibly multiple) gradient up-
dates. Next, we compute the norms of each δt,k and project
the sequence of norms back onto an `q-ball of radius B.
The resulting projected norms at each time point now rep-
resents the individual budgets, bk, of the spatial dimension
at each time step. Finally, we project the original δt,k ob-
tained in the previous step onto the `p-balls of radii bk, re-
spectively to get the final perturbations δ′t,k.
2 We note that
to perform virtual roll-outs at every time step t, the state of
the Eadv has to be the same as the state of Enom at t. To
2Intuitively, these steps represent the allocation of overall bud-
get B across different time steps.
Algorithm 1: Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) Attack
1 Initialize nominal and adversary environments Enom,
Eadv with same random seed
2 Initialize nominal agent pinom weights, θ
3 Initialize budget B, adversary action buffer Aadv ,
horizon H
4 while t ≤ T do
5 Reset Aadv
6 if H = 0 then
7 Reset H and B
8 while k ≤ H do
9 Compute gradient of surrogate reward∇Radv
10 Compute adversarial action aˆt+ 12 ,k using∇Radv
11 Compute δt,k = aˆt+ 12 ,k − at,k
12 Append δt,k to Aadv
13 Step through Eadv with at,k to get next state
14 Compute ||δt,k||`p for each element in Aadv
15 Project sequence of ||δt,k||`p in Aadv on to ball of
size B to obtain look-ahead sequence of budgets
[bt,k, bt,k+1 . . . bt,k+H ]
16 Project each δt,k in Aadv on to look-ahead sequence
of budgets computed in the previous step to get
sequence [δ′t,k δ
′
t,k+1 . . . δ
′
t,k+H ]
17 Compute projected adversarial action aˆt = at + δ′t,k
18 Step through Enom with aˆt
19 B ← max(0, B − δ′t,k)
20 H ← H − 1
accomplish this, we saved the history of all previous actions
to re-compute the state of the Eadv at time t from t = 0.
While this current implementation may be time-consuming,
we believe that this problem can be avoided by giving the
adversary direct access to the current state of the nominal
agent through platform API-level modifications; or explicit
observations (in real-life problems).
In subsequent time steps, the procedure above is repeated
with a reduced budget of B −∑tt=0 δ′t and reduced horizon
H − t until H reaches zero. The horizon H is then reset
again for planning a new spatiotemporal attack. An alterna-
tive formulation could also be shifting the window without
reducing its length until the adversary decides to stop the at-
tack. However, we consider the first formulation such that
we can compare the performance of LAS with MAS for an
equal overall budget. This technique of re-planning the δ′t at
every step while shifting the window of H is similar to the
concept of receding horizons regularly used in optimal con-
trol (Mayne and Michalska 1990). It is evident that using this
form of dynamic re-planning mitigates the planning error
that occurs when the actual and simulated state trajectories
diverge due to error accumulation (Qin and Badgwell 2003).
Hence, we perform this re-planning at every t to account for
this deviation. The pseudocode is provided in Alg. 1.
(a) MAS
(b) LAS
Figure 1: Visual comparison of MAS and LAS. In MAS,
each δt is computed via multi-step gradient descent w.r.t. ex-
pected rewards for the current step. In LAS, each δ
′
t,k is com-
puted w.r.t. the dynamics of the agent with receding horizon.
An adversarial agent & environment is used to compute LAS
for each step. Projection is applied to each δt in the temporal
domain. The final perturbed action is obtained by adding the
first δ
′
t,k to the nominal action. This is done until the end of
the attack window, i.e., H − t = 0.
Theoretical Analysis
We can show that projected gradient descent on the surro-
gate reward function (modeled by the RL agent network) to
generate both MAS and LAS attacks provably converges;
this can be accomplished since gradient descent on a surro-
gate function is akin to a noisy gradient descent on the true
adversarial reward.
As described in previous sections, our MAS/LAS algo-
rithms are motivated in terms of the adversarial rewardRadv .
However, if we use either DQN or policy gradient networks,
we do not have direct access to the reward function, but only
its noisy proxy, defined via a neural network. Therefore, we
need to argue that performing (projected) gradient descent
using this proxy loss function is a sound procedure. To do
this, we appeal to a recent result by (Ge et al. 2015), who
prove convergence of noisy gradient descent approximately
converges to a local minimum. More precisely, consider a
general constrained nonlinear optimization problem:
min f(x)
s.t. c(x) = 0,
where c is an arbitrary (differentiable, possibly vector-
valued) function encoding the constraints. Define S =
{x|c(x) = 0} define the constraint set. We attempt to min-
imize the objective function via noisy (projected) gradient
updates:
xt+1/2 = xt − η∇f(xt) + ξt ,
xt+1 = PS(xt+1/2).
Theorem 1. (Convergence of noisy projected gradients.) As-
sume that the noise terms {ξt} are i.i.d., satisfying E[ξ] =
0, E[ξξT ] = σ2Id, ‖ξ‖ ≤ O(1) almost surely. Assume that
both the constraint function c()˙ and the objective function
f(·) is β-smooth, L-Lipschitz, and possesses ρi-Lipschitz
Hessian. Assume further that the objective function f is B-
bounded. Then, there exists a learning rate η = O(1) such
that with high probability, in polylog(1/η2) iterations, noisy
projected gradient descent converges to a point xˆ that is
polylog(
√
η)-close to some local minimum of f .
In our case, f and ξ depends on the structure of the RL
agent’s neural network. (Smoothness assumptions of f can
perhaps be justified by limiting the architecture of the net-
work, but the iid-ness assumption on ξ is hard to verify).
As such, it is difficult to ascertain whether the assump-
tions of the above theorem are satisfied in specific cases.
Nonetheless, an interesting future theoretical direction is to
understand Lipschitz-ness properties of specific families of
DQN/policy gradient agents.
We defer further analysis of the double projection step
onto mixed-norm balls used in our proposed LAS algorithms
to the supplementary material.
Experimental Results & Discussion
To demonstrate the effectiveness and versatility of our meth-
ods, we implemented them on RL agents with continuous
action environments from OpenAI’s gym (Brockman et al.
2016) as they reflect the type of action space in most prac-
tical applications 3. For policy-based methods, we trained a
nominal agent using the PPO algorithm and a DoubleDQN
(DDQN) agent (Van Hasselt, Guez, and Silver 2016) for
value-based methods4. Additionally, we utilize Normalized
Advantage Functions (Gu et al. 2016) to convert the discrete
nature of DDQN’s output to continuous action space. For
succinctness, we present the results of the attack strategies
only on PPO agent for the Lunar-Lander environment. Addi-
tional results of DDQN agent in Lunar Lander and Bipedal-
Walker environments and PPO agent in Bipedal-Walker,
Mujoco Hopper, Half-Cheetah and Walker environments are
provided in the supplementary materials. As a baseline, we
implemented a random action space attack, where a random
perturbation bounded by the same budget b is applied to the
agent’s action space at every step. For MAS attacks, we im-
plemented two different spatial projection schemes, `1 pro-
jection based on (Condat 2016b) that represents a sparser
distribution and `2 projection that represents a denser distri-
bution of attacks. For LAS attacks, all combinations of spa-
tial and temporal projection for `1 and `2 were implemented.
3Codes and links to supplementary are available at https://
github.com/xylee95/Spatiotemporal-Attack-On-Deep-RL-Agents
4The only difference in implementation of policy vs value-
based methods is that in policy methods, we take analytical gra-
dients of a distribution to compute the attacks (e.g., in line 10 of
Algorithm 1) while for value-based methods, we randomly sample
adversarial actions to compute numerical gradients.
Budget: 3
Cu
m
ul
at
iv
e 
Re
w
ar
d
Budget: 4 Budget: 5
H
orizon: 5
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orizon: 10
(a) (b) (c)
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Figure 2: Box plots of PPO Lunar Lander showing average cumulative reward across 10 episodes for each attack methods.
The top Figs. (a-c) have H=5 with B= 3, 4, and 5 respectively. For a direct comparison, corresponding MAS budgets are
taken as b = B/H . Similarly, Figs.(d-f) have the same B values but with H=10. An obvious trend is that as B increases, the
effectiveness of LAS over MAS becomes more evident as seen in the decreasing trend of the reward.
Comparison of MAS and LAS Attacks
Fig. 2 shows distributions of cumulative rewards obtained by
the PPO agent across ten episodes in a Lunar Lander envi-
ronment, with each subplot representing different combina-
tions of budget, B and horizon, H . Top three subplots show
experiments with a H value of 5 time steps and b value of
3, 4, and 5 from left to right respectively. Bottom row of fig-
ures show a similar set of experiments but with a H value of
10. For a direct comparison between MAS and LAS attacks
with equivalent budgets across time, we have assigned the
corresponding MAS budget values as b = B/H . This as-
sumes that the total budget B is allocated uniformly across
every time step for a given H , while LAS has the flexibil-
ity to allocate the attack budget non-uniformly in the same
interval, conditioned on the dynamics of the agent.
We note that keeping H constant while increasing B pro-
vides both MAS and LAS with a higher budget to inject δt to
the nominal actions. We observe that with a low budget of 3
(Fig. 2a), only LAS is successful in attacking the RL agent,
as seen by the corresponding decrease in rewards. With a
higher budget of 5 (Fig. 2c), MAS has a more apparent ef-
fect on the performance of the RL agent while LAS reduces
the performance of the agent severely.
With B constant, increasing H allows the allocated B
to be distributed along the increased time horizon. In other
words, LAS virtually looks-ahead further into the future. In
the most naive case, a longer horizon dilutes the severity of
each δt in compared to shorter horizons. By comparing sim-
ilar budget values of different horizons (i.e horizons 5 and
10 for budget 3, Fig. 2a and Fig. 2d respectively), attacks for
H = 10 are generally less severe than their H = 5 counter-
parts. For all B and H combinations, we observe that MAS
attacks are generally less effective compared to LAS. We
note that this is a critical result of the study as most literature
on static attacks have shown that the attacks can be ineffec-
tive below a certain budget. Here, we demonstrate that while
MAS attacks can seemingly look ineffective for a given bud-
get, a stronger and more effective attack can essentially be
crafted using LAS with the same budget.
In the following sections, we further study the difference
between MAS and LAS as well as demonstrate how the at-
tacks can be utilized to understand the vulnerabilities of the
agent in different environments.
Action Dimension Decomposition of LAS Attacks
Fig. 3 shows action dimension decomposition of LAS at-
tacks. The example shown in Fig. 3 is the result of `2 pro-
jection in action space with `2 projection in time. From Fig.
3a, we observe that through all the episodes of LAS attacks,
one of the action dimension (i.e., Up - Down direction of lu-
nar lander) is consistently perturbed more, i.e., accumulates
more attack, than Left-Right direction.
Fig. 3b shows a detailed view of action dimension at-
tacks for an episode (Episode 1). It is evident from the fig-
ure that the Up-Down actions of the lunar lander are more
prone to attacks throughout the episode than Left-Right ac-
tions. Additionally, Left-Right action attacks are restricted
after certain time steps and only the Up-Down actions are
attacked further. Fig. 3c further corroborates the observation
in the Lunar Lander environment. As the episode progresses
Figure 3: Time vs Attack magnitude along action dimension for LAS attacks with B = 4, H = 5 in Lunar Lander environment
with PPO RL agent. (a) Variation of attack magnitude along Up-Down and Left-Right action dimensions through different
episodes. In all episodes except episode 2, Up-Down action is more heavily attacked than Left-Right. (b) Variation of attack
magnitude through time for episode 1 of (a). After 270 steps, the agent is not attacked in the Left-Right dimension, but heavily
attacked in Up-Down directions. (c) Actual rendering of Lunar Lander environment for episode 1 of (a) corresponding to (b).
Frame 1-5 are strictly increasing time steps showing trajectory of the RL agent controlling the lunar lander.
in Fig. 3c, the lunar lander initially lands on the ground in
frame 3, but lifts up and hovers until the episode ends in
frame 5. This observation supports the fact that the pro-
posed attacks are effective in perturbing the action dimen-
sions in an optimal manner; as in this case, perturbing the
lunar lander in the horizontal direction will not further de-
crease rewards. On the other hand, hovering the lunar lander
will cause the agent to use more fuel, which consequently
decreases the total reward. From these studies, it can be con-
cluded that LAS attacks (correlated with projections of ac-
tions in time) can clearly isolate vulnerable action dimen-
sion(s) of the RL agent to mount a successful attack.
Ablation Study of Horizon and Budget
Lastly, we performed multiple ablation studies to compare
the effectiveness of LAS and MAS attacks. While we have
observed that LAS attacks are generally stronger than MAS,
we hypothesize that there will be an upper limit to LAS’s
advantage as the allowable budget increases. We take the
difference of each attack’s reduction in rewards (i.e. attack
- nominal) and visualize how much rewards LAS reduces
as compared to MAS under different conditions of B and
H . In the case of PPO in Lunar Lander, we observe that the
reduction in rewards of LAS vs MAS becomes less drastic as
budget increases, hence showing that LAS has diminishing
returns as both MAS and LAS saturates at higher budgets.
We defer detailed discussions and additional figures of the
ablation study to the supplementary materials.
Conclusion & Future Work
In this study, we present two novel attack strategies on an
RL agent’s action space; a myopic attack (MAS) and a non-
myopic attack (LAS). The results show that LAS attacks,
that were crafted with explicit use of the agent’s dynam-
ics information, are more powerful than MAS attacks. Ad-
ditionally, we observed that applying LAS attacks on RL
agents reveals the possible vulnerable actuators of an agent,
as seen by the non-uniform distribution of attacks on cer-
tain action dimensions. This can be leveraged as a tool to
identify the vulnerabilities and plan a mitigation strategy un-
der similar attacks. Possible future works include extending
the concept of LAS attacks to state space attacks where the
agent’s observations are perturbed instead of the agent’s ac-
tions while taking into account the dynamics of the agent.
Additionally, while we did not focus on the imperceptibility
and deployment aspects of the proposed attacks in this study,
defining a proper metric in terms of detectability in action
space and optimizing the budget to remain undetected for
different environments will be a future research direction.
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Pseudocode of MAS Attack
Algorithm 2: Myopic Action Space (MAS) Attack
1 Initialize nominal environment, Enom, nominal agent
pinom with weights, θ
2 Initialize budget b
3 while t ≤ T do
4 Compute gradient of surrogate reward∇Radv
5 Compute adversarial action aˆt+ 12 using∇ Radv
6 Compute δt = aˆt+ 12 − at, project δt onto ball of
size b to get δ′t
7 Compute projected adversarial action aˆt = at + δ′t
8 Step through Enom with aˆt to get next state
Analysis
Projections onto Mixed-norm Balls
The Look-ahead Action Space (LAS) Attack Model de-
scribed above requires projecting onto the mixed-norm `p,q-
ball of radius B in a vector space. Below, we show how
to provably compute such projections in a computationally
efficient manner. For a more complete treatment, we refer
to (Sra 2012). Recall the definition of the (p, q)-norm. Let
X ∈ Rm×n be partitioned into sub-vectors xi, i ∈ [n] of
length-m. Then,
‖X‖p,q :=
(
n∑
i=1
‖xi‖pq
)1/p
.
Due to scale invariance of norms, we can assume B = 1.
We consider the following special cases:
1. p = 1, q = 1: this reduces to the case of the ordinary
`1-norm in Rmn. Projection onto the unit `1-ball can be
achieved via soft-thresholding every entry in X:
PS(Xi,j) = sign(Xi,j) · (|Xi,j | − λ)+,
where λ > 0 is a KKT parameter that can be discovered
by a simple sorting the (absolute) values of X . See (Con-
dat 2016a).
2. p = 2, q = 2: this reduces to the case of the isotropic
`2-norm in Rmn. Projection onto the unit `2-ball can be
achieved by simple normalization:
PS(Xi,j) = Xi,j/‖X‖2,2.
3. p = 1, q = 2: this is a “hybrid” combination of the above
two cases, and corresponds to the procedure that we use
in mounting our LAS attack. Projection onto this ball can
be achieved by a three-step method. First, we compute the
n-dimensional vector, v, of column-wise `2-norms. Then,
we project v onto the unit `1-ball; essentially, this enables
us to “distribute” the (unit) budget across columns. Since
`1-projection is achieved via soft-thresholding, a number
of coordinates of this vector are zeroed out, and others
undergo a shrinkage. Call this (sparsified) projected vec-
tor vp. Finally, we perform an `2 projection, i.e., we scale
each column of X by dividing by its norm and multiply-
ing by the entries of vp:
PS(Xi,j) =
Xi,j
‖xj‖2 · vp(i).
Additional Experiments
Comparison of Attacks Mounted on PPO Agent in
Bipedal-Walker Environment
The results in Fig. 4 depicts the comparison between the
MAS and LAS attacks applied on a PPO agent in the
Bipedal-Walker environment. A similar trend is observed
where LAS attacks are generally more severe than MAS at-
tacks. We acknowledge that in this environment, MAS at-
tacks are sometimes effective in reducing the rewards as
well. However, this can be attributed to the Bipedal Walker
having more dimensions (4 dimensions) in terms of it’s ac-
tion space in compared to the Lunar-Lander (2 dimensions)
environment. In addition, the actions of the Bipedal Walker
is also highly coupled, in compared to the actions of the
Lunar Lander. Hence, the agent for Bipedal-Walker is more
sensitive towards perturbations, which explains the increase
efficacy of MAS attacks.
Comparison of Attacks Mounted on DDQN Agent
in Lunar Lander and Bipedal-Walker
Environments
In Figures 5 and 6, we present additional results on the ef-
ficacy of different attack strategies for a DoubleDQN agent
trained in the Lunar Lander and Bipedal Walker environ-
ment. An interesting observation is that in both environment,
the effects of the attacks are more severe for the DDQN
agent in compared to the PPO agent as seen in the box-plots.
We conjecture that this is due to the deterministic nature of
DDQN method where the optimal action is unique. In con-
trast, the PPO agent was trained with a certain stochastic in
the process, which might explain the additional robustness
of PPO agent to noise or perturbations. Nevertheless, in the
DDQN agent, we still observe a similar trend where given
the same about of budget, more severe attacks can be crafted
using the LAS strategy in compared to MAS or random at-
tacks.
Comparison of Attacks Mounted on PPO Agent
Mujoco Control Environments
In addition to the attacks mounted on the agents in the 2
environments above, we also compare the effect of the at-
tacks on a PPO agent trained in 3 different Mujoco control
environments. Figures 7, 8, 9 illustrates the distribution of
rewards obtained by the agent in the Hopper, Half-Cheetah
and Walker environments respectively. In all three environ-
ments, we observe that LAS attacks are generally more ef-
fective in reducing the rewards of the agent across differ-
ent values of budget and horizon, which reinforces the fact
that LAS attacks are stronger than MAS attacks. However,
it is also interesting to note that agents in different environ-
ments have different sensitivity to the budget of attacks. In
Hopper(Figure 7) and Walker(Figure 9), we see that MAS
attacks have the effect of shifting the median and increasing
the variance of the reward distortion with respect to the nom-
inal, which highlights the fact that there are some episodes
which MAS attack fails to affect the agent. In contrast, in
the Half-Cheetah environment(Figure 8), we see that MAS
attacks shifts the whole distribution of rewards downwards,
showing that the agent is more sensitive in to MAS in this en-
vironment as compared to the other two environments. This
suggests that the budget and horizon values are also hyper-
parameters which should be tuned according to the environ-
ment.
Figure 4: Boxplots showing cumulative rewards of PPO agent in Bipedal-Walker environment under different attack strategies
across 10 different episodes. Plots (a), (b) and (c) are attacked with a horizon of 5 time steps with budget value of 7, 8, and 9
respectively. (d), (e), and (f) are attacked with a horizon value of 10 time steps with budget value B of 7, 8, and 9.
Figure 5: DDQN Lunar Lander box plots showing average cumulative reward across 10 episodes for each attack method. Plots
(a), (b) and (c) are attacked with a horizon of 5 time steps with budget value of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. (d), (e), and (f) are
attacked with a horizon value of 10 time steps with budget value of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Given the same horizon and budget,
it is evident LAS attacks are more severe than MAS attacks, which in turn are generally more effective than random attacks.
Figure 6: DDQN Bipedal Walker box plots showing average cumulative reward across 10 episodes for each attack method.
Plots (a), (b) and (c) are attacked with a horizon of 5 time steps with budget value of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. (d), (e), and (f) are
attacked with a horizon value of 10 time steps with budget value of 3, 4, and 5 respectively. Given the same horizon and budget,
it is evident LAS attacks are more severe than MAS attacks, which in turn are generally more effective than random attacks.
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Figure 7: Box plots depicting distribution of rewards obtained by PPO agent in Mujoco Hopper environment under different
attacks. In this set of experiments, we used a values of B = 2, 3, and 4 for values of H=5 and 10. We observe similar reward
trends where LAS attacks are generally stronger than MAS attacks across all values of budget and horizon.
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Figure 8: Box plots depicting distribution of rewards obtained by PPO agent in Mujoco Half-Cheetah environment under
different attacks. In this set of experiments, we used a values of B = 2, 3, and 4 for values of H=5 and 10. In this environment,
the agent is more sensitive to the attacks for the budget values tested, where even a B=2 significantly decreases the distribution
of rewards for MAS attacks. Nonetheless, we still observe similar reward trends where LAS attacks are generally stronger than
MAS attacks across all values of budget and horizon. This suggests that the agent in this environment can easily be adversarially
perturbed even with limited budget.
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Figure 9: Box plots depicting distribution of rewards obtained by PPO agent in Mujoco Walker environment under different
attacks. In this set of experiments, we used same values of B = 2, 3, and 4 for values of H=5 and 10 as the other Mujoco envi-
ronments tested above. Similar reward trends where LAS attacks decreases rewards more than MAS attacks are also observed
across all values of budget and horizon. In this environment, the shifts in reward distribution are less drastic, especially for
B=2, when comparing different attacks. This suggests that the agent might be more robust in this case and information from
the environment dynamics is actually required to significantly affect the agent as seen in plot (d).
Comparison of Temporal Projections in LAS
In this section, we present additional visualizations to
further understand why `2 temporal projections results in
more severe attacks in compared to `1 temporal projections.
Figure 10, 11, 12 and 13 presents the ‖δt‖ usage plot
across 100 time steps for both PPO and DDQN in the Lunar
Lander and Bipedal-Walker environment. The left subplot
represents `1 projections in the spatial dimension while
the right subplot represents `2 projections in the spatial
dimensions. These plots directly compare the difference in
amount of ‖δt‖ used between `1 and `2 temporal projections
for both `1 and `2 spatial attacks.
In most cases with the exception of Figure 12, we see
a clear trend that `1 temporal projections results in a sparser
but more concentrated peaks of ‖δ‖ utilization (corre-
sponding to a few instance of strong attacks). In contrast,
`2 temporal projections results in a more distributed but
frequent form of of ‖δ‖ utilization (corresponding to more
frequent but weak instances of attacks). We note that
while `1 projections produces stronger attacks, there is a
diminishing return on allocating more attacks to a certain
time point as after a certain limit. Hence, this explains the
weaker effect of `1 temporal projections since it concen-
trates the attacks to a few points but ultimately gives time
for the agent to recover. In contrast, `2 temporal projections
distributes the attacks more frequently that causes the agent
to follow a diverging trajectory that is hard to recover from.
As an anecdotal example in the Lunar Lander environ-
ment, we observe that attacks with `1 temporal projection
tend to turn off the vertical thrusters of the lunar lander.
However, due to the sparsity of the attacks, the RL agent
could possibly be fire the upward thrusters in time to prevent
a free-fall landing. With `2 temporal projections, the agent
is attacked continuously. Consequently, the agent has no
chance to return to a nominal state and quickly diverges
towards a terminal state.
Ablation Study
For this section, we present an ablation study to investigate
the effect of different budget and horizon parameters on the
effectiveness of LAS vs MAS. As mentioned in the main
manuscript, we take the difference of each attack’s reduction
in rewards (i.e. attack - nominal) and visualize how much
rewards LAS reduces as compared to MAS under differ-
ent conditions of B and H . Fig 14 illustrates the ablation
study of a PPO agent in Lunar Lander. The figure is catego-
rized by different spatial projections, where `1 spatial pro-
jections are shown on the left figure while `2 spatial projec-
tions are shown on the right. Both subplots are shown for `2
time projection attacks. Each individual subplot shows three
different lines with different H , with each line visualizing
the change in mean cumulative reward as budget increases
along the x-axis. As budget increases, attacks in both `1 and
`2 spatial projection shows a monotonic decrease in cumu-
lative rewards. Attacks in each spatial projection with a H
value of 5 shows different trends, where `2 decreases lin-
early with increasing budget while `1 became stagnant after
B value of 3. This can be attributed to the fact that the attacks
are more sparsely distributed in `1 attacks, causing most of
the perturbations to be distributed into one action dimen-
sion. Thus, as budget increases, we see a diminishing return
of LAS attacks since attacking a single action dimension be-
yond a certain limit doesn’t decrease reward any further. The
study was also conducted for PPO Bipedal-Walker and both
DDQN Lunar Lander and Bipedal-Walker as shown in Fig-
ure 16, 15 and 17 respectively. We only consider attacks
in `2 temporal projection attacks for both `1 and `2 spatial
projections. At a glance, we see different trends across each
figures due to the different environment dynamics. However,
in all cases, the decrease in reduction of rewards is always
lesser than or equals to zero, which infers that LAS attacks
are at least as effective than MAS attacks. We observed that
attacks for horizon value of 5 becomes ineffective after a cer-
tain budget value. This shows that after some budget value,
MAS attacks are as effective as LAS attacks because LAS
might be operating at maximum attack capacity. Interesting
to note that Bipedal-Walker for PPO needed a higher budget
compared to the DDQN counterpart due to the PPO being
more robust to attacks.
Effect of Horizon Parameter in LAS
In this section, we further describe the effect of horizon pa-
rameter H on the effectiveness of LAS attacks that we em-
pirically observed.H defines a fixed time horizon (e.g., steps
in DRL environments) to expend a given budget B. For a
fixed B and short H , LAS favors injecting stronger pertur-
bations in each step. Hence, we would intuitively hypothe-
size that given a shorter H , the severity of LAS attacks will
increase as H decrease, as shown by the reduction in re-
wards between MAS and LAS in Figure 3 of the main paper.
In most cases, the reduction is negative, hence showing that
LAS attacks are indeed more severe. However in some cases
as shown in Figure 8, 9 & 10, a shorterH does result in LAS
being not as effective as a longer H (though still stronger
than MAS as evident from negative values of y-axis). This
can be attributed to the nonlinear reward function of the en-
vironments and consequent failure modes of the agent. For
example, attacks on Lunar Lander PPO agent causes failure
by constantly firing thruster engines to prevent Lunar Lan-
der from landing, hence accumulating negative rewards over
a long time. In contrast, attacks on the DQN agent causes
Lunar Lander to crash immediately, hence terminating the
episode before too much negative reward is accumulated.
Thus, while the effect of H on LAS attacks sometimes do
not show a consistent trend, we it is a key parameter that can
be tuned to control the failure modes of the RL agent.
Action Space Dimension Decomposition
We provide additional results on using the LAS attack
scheme as a tool to understand the RL agent’s action space
vulnerabilities for a DoubleDQN agent in both Lunar Lan-
der and Bipedal Walker environment. It is interesting to
note in Figure 18, even with agents trained with a differ-
ent philosophy (value-based vs policy based, shown in main
manuscript), the attack scheme still distributes the attack to
a similar dimension (Up-Down action for Lunar Lander),
which highlights the importance of the that particular di-
mension. In Figure 19, we show the outcome of LAS at-
tack scheme on Bipedal Walker environment having four ac-
tion space dimensions. The four joints of the bipedal walker,
namely Left Hip, Left Knee, Right Hip and Right Knee are
attacked in this case, and from Figure 19, we see that the
left hip is attacked more than any other action dimension in
most of the episodes. This supports our inference that LAS
attacks can bring out the vulnerabilities in the action space
dimensions (actuators in case of CPS RL agents).
Figure 10: Comparison of ‖δt‖ used across time for a single episode in PPO Lunar Lander for different spatial projections with
`1 and `2 temporal projection. Left plot illustrates `1 spatial projection and right plot shows `2 spatial projection. In both plots,
the magnitude of attacks with `1 temporal projection attacks dropped to zero from time step 30. However, the magnitude of
attacks in `2 temporal projection remains high through the episode. Hence, we observe that `1 temporal projections essentially
allows the agent sufficient time to recover from earlier attacks. In the case of Lunar Lander, the agent might prevent a severe
crash while landing or recover from a horizontal thruster boost induced by the attack.
Figure 11: ‖δt‖ usage plot of DDQN agent in Lunar Lander across time for a single episode. Left subplot illustrates `1 spatial
attacks while right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. In each subplot, attacks with `1 time projection attacks exhibit periodic
spiked patterns while `2 time projection attacks are constantly activated with ‖δt‖ never reaching zero. Since `1 time projection
attacks periodically inject δt into nominal actions of the DDQN agent, the agent has the opportunity to recover from the attacks.
Figure 12: ‖δt‖ usage plot for PPO agent in Bipedal-Walker across time for a single episode. Left subplot illustrates `1 spatial
attacks while right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. In this figure, both `1 and ell2 are seemingly well distributed, although
the magnitude of ‖δt‖ used for both projection schemes are evidently lesser than the other agents in other environments. We
speculate that this is due to the nature of the policy learnt by the PPO agent. In this environment, the PPO agent has learnt a
policy to operate the Bipedal Walker by bending a knee joint and using the other knee joint to drag itself forward. Hence, in
this situation, the agent has learnt a strong stable walking gait and there is not much room for δt to be applied.
Figure 13: ‖δt‖ usage plot for DDQN agent in Bipedal-Walker across time for a single episode. Left subplot illustrates `1 spatial
attacks while the right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. A trend similar to Fig 11 is observed here where the ‖δt‖ are utilized in
sparse and concentrated instances for `1 temporal projections in compared to `2 temporal projections.
Figure 14: Ablation study for PPO Lunar Lander showing effectiveness of attacks comparing LAS with MAS for `2 time
projection attacks. Left and right subplot shows `1 and `2 spatial projection respectively. Each subplot contains different lines
representing different horizon, where budget is incrementally increased along each horizon. Both `1 and `2 spatial projection
scales monotonically with increasing budget.
Figure 15: Ablation study for DDQN Lunar Lander showing effectiveness of attacks comparing LAS with MAS. Left subplot
shows `1 spatial attacks while right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. Both plots are in `2 temporal projection attacks. Each
subplot contains different lines representing different horizon, where budget is incrementally increased along each horizon.
Figure 16: Ablation study for PPO Bipedal-Walker showing effectiveness of attacks comparing LAS with MAS. Left subplot
shows `1 spatial attacks while right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. Both plots are in `2 temporal projection attacks. Each
subplot contains different lines representing different horizon, where budget is incrementally increased along each horizon.
Figure 17: Ablation study for DDQN Bipedal-Walker showing effectiveness of attacks comparing LAS with MAS. Left subplot
shows `1 spatial attacks while right subplot shows `2 spatial attacks. Both plots are in `2 temporal projection attacks. Each
subplot contains different lines representing different horizon, where budget is incrementally increased along each horizon.
Figure 18: Magnitude of attack with respect to different episodes for Lunar Lander environment with DoubleDQN RL agent.
The two colors (Blue and Green) in the bar plots represent the attacks allocated to the two action space dimensions, Up-Down
action and Left-Right action, respectively. The attack schema is LAS attack with a budget of 4 and Horizon of 5.
Figure 19: Magnitude of attack with respect to different episodes for Bipedal Walker environment with DoubleDQN RL agent.
The four colors (Blue, Green, Red and Cyan) in the bar plots represent the attacks allocated to the four action space dimensions,
Left Hip, Left Knee, Right Hip and Right Knee actions, respectively. The attack schema is LAS attack with a budget of 4 and
Horizon of 5.
